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Abstract
Hidden Champions (HCs) are small- and medium-sized global market leaders that repeatedly 
show superior innovation capabilities and economic performance. However, empirical evi-
dence on how the digital transformation may affect their success story remains scarce. I argue 
that HCs show stronger dynamic capabilities which enables them to be better prepared for the 
digital transformation than non-HCs firms. To test this hypothesis, I use data from the Mann-
heim Innovation Panel. This allows me to identify a representative set of German HCs and 
develop a firm digital readiness index, reflecting the use of important digital technologies and 
applications. An instrumental variable estimation suggests that higher levels of digital 
readiness lead to an increase in share of revenue from innovations and productivity. In 
combination with higher average digital readiness levels of HCs compared to non-HCs, my 
findings indicate that HCs may indeed be better prepared for the digital transformation.
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the century, advances in computation power and a global access to the
Internet have accelerated the digitalization of the business environment. This digital transfor-
mation increasingly affects firm strategies, fosters innovation, and creates entirely new business
models (Rogers 2016). Studies show that already the digitization of formerly analogous organ-
izational processes can significantly increase efficiency and flexibility within organizations
(Markovitch & Willmott 2014; Isaksson et al. 2018). Digitally enabled technologies and appli-
cations are the foundation of the internet of things and create substantial amounts of information
every day with current estimates expecting an annual growth in worldwide data volume of more
than 30% (The Economist 2020). Developments such as big data and increasingly sophisticated
machine learning algorithms enable firms to utilize this data and extract valuable new infor-
mation about customers, markets, and supply chains. This allows companies to streamline in-
ternal processes and make more accurate predictions about market trends and customer behav-
ior. In the past, such computation-intensive processes often required significant investments in
a capable infrastructure that only few large firms were able to bear. Today, the cloud allows to
outsource some of these tasks and significantly reduce investment risks, especially for small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Isaksson et al. 2018). This ena-
bles a broad spectrum of firms to access a variety of digital applications and further accelerates
the diffusion of digitalization.
The emergence of new revenues streams and improved customer relationships are just a few
examples of the potential added benefits of these developments to those firms that are able to
quickly adapt their business to this data-driven environment and to build the necessary (digital)
innovation1 capabilities (The Economist 2020). Today, some of the most valuable and profita-
ble firms worldwide primarily base their business around digital products or services and within
a few years the share of these ‘tech’-focused firms in the S&P 500 has skyrocketed (Statista
2020). Yet, an increasing number of companies with long successful business models fail to
adapt and even former market leaders are not immune to the disruptive impact of digitalization
(Hanelt et al. 2015; FAZ 2019; Thangavelu 2020).
1 Innovation broadly refers to the, at least attempted, implementation of an idea (Harhoff 2008; Christensen et
al. 2015). Baregheh et al. (2009) have identified over 60 different definitions and typologies of innovations.
However, in this paper it encompasses major improvements or novel approaches in the context of a firm’s pro-
cesses, products, or its business model (OECD 2018a, 2018b). Digital innovations specifically refer to “the car-
rying out of new combinations of digital and physical components [in a layered modular architecture] to produce
novel products” (Yoo et al. 2010, p. 725). z
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A small group of German mid-sized firms may provide insights on how companies can suc-
cessfully transform from the analogue to the digital world. These so-called hidden champions2
(HCs) are mid-sized global market leaders that mainly focus on business to business (B2B)
niche markets. Even though they may only represent a small group of firms, their continuous
economic success in competitive markets has generated a worldwide research, media and policy
attention (e.g., Voudouris et al. 2000; Din et al. 2013; Suh & Kim 2014; The Economist 2014;
BMWi 2019). Highly dynamic growth rates over the last decades indicate that they have man-
aged to decouple from the national economic development and as a result some even refer to
them as prime examples of the German ‘Mittelstand’3 (The Economist 2014). According to
estimates, they have created over 300,000 new jobs from 2000 to 2010 in Germany alone and
more than 1,000,000 worldwide (Simon 2012). Highly specialized niche strategies combined
with in-depth customer knowledge and continuous innovation efforts are frequently listed as
key features that differentiate HCs from most of their global competitors (Venohr & Meyer
2007; Simon 2012; Rammer & Spielkamp 2015). So far, it seems that this strategy has paid off
and their sustainable success may suggest that they are also more resilient and adaptable than
most firms (Venohr & Meyer 2007).
Nevertheless, the digital transformation and its implications may test the limits of their business
models and pose a substantial risk to the future economic success of HCs. Existing studies often
remain conceptual and lack any empirical evidence that could provide adequate answers to this
central question. Therefore, this study aims at investigating the preparedness of Germany’s HCs
towards the digital transformation based on representative panel data. To isolate the underlying
features that might account for the findings, it specifically focuses on comparing HCs with non-
HC firms of similar demographic characteristics.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents contextual information
and emphasizes the potential challenges of digital transformation in the context of HCs. Chapter
3 introduces the dynamic capabilities view as theoretical foundation for my hypothesis and
subsequent analysis. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the sample data and the methodology.
Moreover, it introduces a measure of firm digitalization that enables the empirical analysis in
2 According to Simon (2012), who coined the term hidden champion in the early 1990s, they are defined as firms
that, in general, generate below 5 billion Euros in revenues, belong to the top 3 in their respective market globally
or are market leading on their continent, and are relatively unknown to the broader public. Estimates of the
number of HCs range from approximately 1,300 (Simon 2018) up to around 1,700 (Rammer & Spielkamp 2019).
3 Mittelstand broadly refers to mid-sized manufacturers, sometimes referred to as the ‘backbone’ of Germany’s
economy. They tend to be family-owned and usually sell specialized machineries and components for B2B mar-
kets (The Economist 2014).
2 Digital Transformation and Challenges for Hidden Champions 4
Chapter 5, where I investigate and discuss the impact of firm digitalization on performance and
the digital readiness of HCs. The study concludes with a summary and discussion of the results
in Chapter 6.
2 Digital Transformation and Challenges for Hidden Champions
As digitalization advances, it increasingly transforms integral parts of the value creation process
(Hess et al. 2016). The ‘combinatorial’ effects4 of digital technologies accelerate the pace and
scope of change across various organizational levels and enable new digitally geared business
models that overcome existing limitations and create novel channels to address customers
across industries (Yoo et al. 2012). This puts existing firms in danger of disruption as they “face
challenger[s] that offer far greater value to the customer in a way that [it] cannot compete with”
(Rogers 2016, p. 195). Moreover, it radically changes the competitive environment for estab-
lished firms which often face new competition by more digitally advanced companies outside
their own industry. This implies that even long-successful firms may need to be willing to adjust
or even abandon existing asset-driven business models in favor of more data- and network-
driven approaches (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015; IW Consult 2018). Ulti-
mately, it urges firms to lay the organizational foundations that enable the development of in-
novative digital solution.
Research emphasizes that existing innovation approaches may have a limited applicability in
the context of digital innovations. The development of products and services with embedded
digital capabilities usually involves distributed processes and increasingly relies on external
expertise that firms lack internally (Yoo et al. 2012; Müller et al. 2016). In addition, many
digital innovations heavily depend on network effects5 and an interplay of different systems or
products (Bharadwaj et al. 2013). This reinforces the importance of platforms, not only as ena-
blers of customer value creation but also as important development environments for collabo-
rative innovations (Yoo et al. 2012; Manyika et al. 2016).
Several reasons suggest that the very characteristics that are considered as the main drivers of
HCs’ success may in fact impede the necessary structural and strategic adaptations. Although
4 Combinatorial effect refers to the complementary character of many digital technologies. The transformative
effect of combinations of digital technologies is of far greater impact than single technologies alone (e.g., WEF
2020).
5 Network effects as described in economics and business studies are the effects in which the number of users of
a product or network positively affects its value, or in the case of indirect network effects, the value of a com-
plementary product or network. A frequently used example in this context is the invention and expansion of the
telephone (Katz & Shapiro 1994).
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HCs are regularly referred to as ‘drivers of innovation’ and most were founded based on radical
and sometimes disruptive new business ideas, they mainly focus innovation efforts on incre-
mental and continuous improvements of their existing product portfolio (Simon 2018; Rammer
& Spielkamp 2019). Yet, in the context of digitalization firms have to be able to create radical
innovations, leave existing paths and generate new know-how. Along the same lines, speciali-
zation strategies and focus on niche markets may allow HCs to develop products and services
according to customers’ needs but could create limitations in terms of scaling digital innova-
tions and addressing new customer markets (Simon 2009, 2012; Pittrof 2011).
Another characteristic often associated with HCs is an emphasis on strict secrecy measures to
protect knowledge and innovations. Accordingly, HCs seem to be reluctant to openly share
information along development processes or to innovate in collaboration with external partners.
This implies that their innovation activities are still mostly internally driven and reliant on ex-
isting internal competences (Rammer & Spielkamp 2015). In the context of digitalization, this
strict focus on internal capabilities could limit their ability to rapidly develop sophisticated dig-
ital innovations. One particular feature of digital products is that they enable faster development
cycles and increase the speed at which firms can evolve ideas into market-ready solutions.
However, these processes require novel approaches towards innovation and often involve ex-
perimenting and iterative improvements of already marketed products (e.g., minimum viable
products). For many HCs, this may require drastic changes within existing innovation pro-
cesses, as they are usually aligned to hardware-based technologies and aim at providing highly
mature solutions to customers. A core requirement for all digitalization efforts is a suitable
technological and personnel infrastructure. This often demands large-scale investments and re-
mains one of the main challenges in the context of digital transformation (BMWi 2017b). Ra-
ther conservative financing strategies combined with reservations against external ownership
are characteristic for HCs (Haussmann 2003; Simon 2012; Rammer & Spielkamp 2019). Often
family-owned, HCs typically aim at financial independence and, thus, focus on ensuring rela-
tively high shares of equity. This reliance on internal resources may eventually affect their will-
ingness and ability to provide sufficient funding for digitalization initiatives. Like many other
firms in Germany, HCs also struggle to meet the demand in expert personnel, especially in IT-
related professions. However, the fact that most HCs are located in rural areas may further
decrease their ability to attract suitable experts (Simon 2012).
Despite these potential challenges, research specifically targeting digitalization in the context
of HCs remains scarce. Although Simon argues that many HCs engage in digitalization-related
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fields and indicates that they constantly extend their portfolio, especially in the context of in-
dustry 4.0, he does not provide any detailed insights or empirical evidence (Simon 2018, 2019).
Others highlight that many HCs (44%) still show low levels of digital performance and the
application of digital technologies is often limited to websites and social media (Schmieder
2017). To the best of my knowledge there is only one study that, to some extent, investigates
HC digitalization in comparison to other firms. This survey-based study among 82 HCs shows
that most of them are aware of the potential profound implications of digitalization for their
business models (Freimark et al. 2018). In particular, 42% of the surveyed HCs see an imminent
danger of losing market shares due to disruptions caused by the digital transformation. Accord-
ing to the authors, HCs define ‘silo thinking’ and a limited willingness to change as the major
challenges when it comes to promoting digitalization projects in their organizations. Neverthe-
less, more than 40% also believe that their business will primarily profit from the digital trans-
formation in the long run. To ensure a successful transformation, more than 60% of HCs allo-
cate the responsibility for its accomplishment at the top management level and more than a third
of them actively involve their customers in the process. On average, HCs have already fulfilled
half of their self-set transformation targets and 71% of HCs are satisfied with the progress of
digital transformation within their firms compared to just 51% of the surveyed SMEs (Freimark
et al. 2018). Yet, compared to large corporations, HCs do not seem to outperform in terms of
digitalization. This confirms previous findings and indicates that when it comes to the level of
digitalization, firm size often matters (BMWi 2018).
Insights from related SME research further show that many established firms still do not have
a digital strategy, despite empirical findings supporting a positive correlation between invest-
ments in digitalization and firm performance (Kane et al. 2017; The Economist 2020). Accord-
ing to a recent study, the majority of SMEs consider themselves as laggards in the context of
digitalization (Bitkom 2020). This is also reflected in the small share of revenues generated via
electronic channels of just 10% compared to 28% among larger corporations. Moreover, digital
products, services and components only account for 14% of their revenues. Along the same
lines, a study by IW Consult (2018) highlights that just 20% of German SMEs possess the
necessary capabilities to digitalize their products and processes. Overall, these findings may
indicate structural reasons that may impede digital transformation in SMEs and thus may also
apply to HCs.
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3 Theory and Hypothesis
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework that generates insights on how
firms may be able to rapidly adapt to the new environment. This framework is then applied to
the context of HCs in order to generate a hypothesis about the preparedness of HCs towards
digital transformation.
3.1 The Dynamic Capabilities View
The dynamic capabilities view (DCV) is a widely recognized theoretical concept in the context
of change and long-term competitiveness (Furrer et al. 2008; Vogel & Güttel 2013). Teece and
Pisano (1994) first introduced the theory to explain why some companies show “timely respon-
sive and rapid and flexible product innovation, along with the management capability to effec-
tively coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences” (Teece et al. 1997, p. 515).
The idea behind the DCV is that a company’s success is not just based on its resources but that
firm-specific capabilities are the main drivers of competitive advantage. These dynamic capa-
bilities (DCs) are defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and
external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al. 1997, p. 516).
Some special features about these capabilities include that they are path-dependent (Zollo &
Winter 2002), intentionally used (Helfat 1997; Zahra et al. 2006), build over time and, thus,
usually cannot be acquired in the market (Teece et al. 1997; Makadok 2001). Overall, this dif-
ferentiates them from more ordinary capabilities which are supposed to ensure efficiency of
existing business functions and resources (Teece 2016).
Even though research remains ambiguous about how DCs exactly enable long-term survival
and competitive advantage6, empirical research regularly confirms their positive impact. Stud-
ies show that they increase the ability of incumbents to react to market changes (Helfat 1997),
support firms in exploiting new opportunities (Karim & Mitchell 2000), and increase the ability
for organizational renewal (Danneels 2002). In particular, high environmental dynamism char-
acterized by rapidly changing market conditions seems to increase the value and necessity of
6 Some argue that there might be a direct link (Teece et al. 1997; Griffith & Harvey 2001; Lee et al. 2002) while
other emphasize an indirect relationship and argue that they enable resource and competence reconfigurations
that create value for competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Zott 2003).
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DCs7 as they enable firms to create the organizational agility8 to flexibly adapt to new require-
ments (Teece et al. 1997; Winter 2003). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1107) add that DCs
are “the firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure,
gain and release resources – to match and even create market change”.
This indicates that firms should focus on establishing DCs, particularly in the context of digital
transformation where companies need to orchestrate multifaceted, data-rich and dynamic digi-
tal resources. The presence of sound DCs may allow for business model adjustments in such
dynamic environments and eventually improve a firm’s long-term competitiveness. Indeed, re-
search frequently highlights the importance of DCs in the context of digitalization. By investi-
gating digital disruptions in the newspaper industry, Karimi and Walter (2015) show that DCs
can foster the creation of digital platform capabilities and, thus, help firms to successfully re-
spond to digital transformation. Furthermore, Helfat and Raubitschek (2018) emphasize that
DCs enable firms to build ecosystems and design business models in platform-based digital
ecosystems. Teece (2017) provides similar insights by indicating DCs a positive impact along
digital platform lifecycles and showing their potential in improving competitive outcomes.
Along the same lines, Yoo et al. (2012) state that DCs allow firms to share data and processes
within networks which, eventually, enable them to apply heterogeneous modules of teams and
resources that can be flexibly assigned to specific tasks. However, studies also show that firms
often struggle at establishing the necessary level of flexibility for networking between units and
organizations required in times of digitalization (Isaksson et al. 2018). This indicates that DCs
are actually not common and difficult to create. A possible explanation is that established rou-
tines, assets, and resources that support existing business processes create path dependencies
which inhibit the development of DCs. Teece (2007) emphasizes that this may explain why
established companies often tend to favor more incremental and competence-enhancing im-
provements instead of competence-destroying, radical innovations. Even if established firms
manage to build and integrate the necessary abilities, they frequently fail at reconfiguring their
organization according to new market needs due to a persistent focus on ordinary capabilities
(Teece et al. 2016). Along similar lines, Zahra et al. (2006) argue that established firms struggle
7 Firms in markets that are characterized by low dynamism and rates of change, however, should focus on effi-
ciency enhancing ordinary capabilities (Drnevich & Kriauciunas 2011).
8 Dyer and Shafer (1998, p. 6) define organizational agility as “the capacity to be infinitely adaptable without
having to change. It is viewed as a necessary core competence for organizations operating in dynamic external
environments”.
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to build capabilities that leverage their existing business and, simultaneously, enable the crea-
tion of a new competence basis.
3.2 Determinants of Dynamic Capabilities
Teece (2007, p. 1319) states that the ‘micro foundations’ of DCs are “the capacity to sense and
shape opportunities and threats, to seize opportunities, and to maintain competitiveness through
enhancing, combining, reconfiguring the business enterprises intangible and tangible assets”.
These micro foundations usually cannot be directly observed and, thus, are difficult to measure
and evaluate. However, research highlights several, often interlinked, factors that can determine
a firm’s ability for these micro foundations and, therefore, its DCs. In the following, I present
three aggregated competences and related abilities that are regularly highlighted as enablers for
DCs.
First, research generally identifies innovation competence as a crucial determinant of DCs.
Some argue that dynamic capabilities enable successful innovation (Teece 2007; Drnevich &
Kriauciunas 2011), whereas others even treat them as synonyms (Collis 1994; Winter 2003). In
this paper, however, I follow the view of Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) who argue that innova-
tion capabilities are key components of DCs, since they permit the renewal and reconfiguration
of firm resources. Moreover, they enable the creation of new knowledge and can support man-
agers in sensing and seizing new opportunities. This integral view of innovation capabilities is
widely supported in DCV literature (Helfat et al. 2007; Wang & Ahmed 2007). Research in the
context of digitalization in general supports the significance of innovation competence and em-
phasizes the need for digital innovation capabilities (Yoo et al. 2010; Hess et al. 2016). Accord-
ing to Yoo et al. (2010, p. 725), such digital innovations rely on the digitization of physical
products and require a firm “to revisit its organizing logic and its use of corporate IT infrastruc-
ture”. Danneels (2002) further claims that innovation capability itself is closely dependent on
an interplay of customer and technological competence. The latter broadly describes the firm’s
ability to create a certain product based on existing know-how and equipment. Extended to the
context of digital transformation, the renewal and reconfiguration of a firm’s technological
competence towards more digital technology competences seems to be crucial. These digital
competences may not only help firms to develop new products or services and business pro-
cesses but eventually enable new customer relationships and business models (Drnevich &
Kriauciunas 2011). Apart from a suitable technology base, strong customer competence allows
a firm to create in-depth knowledge of customer needs and processes and to extend its customer
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base. By covering distribution and communication channels as well as the firm’s brand reputa-
tion, it further facilitates the marketing of innovations. From a DCV perspective, this may allow
firms to not only sense changes in markets earlier than others, but also to successfully seize
new (digital) products or services.
Second, Rothaermel and Hess (2007, p. 916f.) emphasize the importance of leadership compe-
tence and state that “managers who take a discerning and discriminating approach towards se-
lecting innovation mechanisms will be most successful in building the dynamic capabilities
necessary to continuously innovate”. Teece and Augier (2009, p. 417) specifically highlight the
role of management in “selecting and/or developing routines, making investment choices, and
in orchestrating nontradable assets to achieve efficiencies and appropriate returns”. They fur-
ther suggest that entrepreneurial leadership in particular can help firms to sense new opportu-
nities and, eventually, enable to seize them. Contrary to managerial activities, which tend to
concentrate on standardization and optimization, entrepreneurial leadership emphasizes inno-
vation and novel approaches to existing problems (Teece 2012). Rather than maintaining and
refining the status-quo, entrepreneurial leaders focus on solutions to future challenges and op-
portunities. These specific leadership characteristics can directly create and maintain existing
DCs within organizations (Teece 2014; Teece et al. 2016).
Third, research highlights the importance of agile organizational structures and processes in
facilitating DCs (Augier & Teece 2009; Teece 2016). In particular, firms should foster ex-
change between business units and functions as well as limit hierarchical structures, so that
sensing, seizing, and resource reconfiguration can be distributed throughout the organization.
Teece (2007) further elaborates that decentralized processes and structures may help firms to
develop integration and coordination skills, promoting a continuous alignment and realignment
of existing assets. Such decentralization efforts should not be limited to the internal organiza-
tion but explicitly take a firm’s external environment into account. This implies that firms ena-
ble information and knowledge flows across organizational boundaries (Reitzig & Maciejovsky
2015). In this context, Pitelis and Teece (2010) emphasize so-called co-creation processes.
These processes include internal cross-functional as well as joint processes with external part-
ners. Along similar lines, Martin and Eisenhardt (2000) specifically argue that alliances and
collaborations are important for the reconfiguration of assets and, thus, represent potential
sources of DCs. Figure 1 illustrates the identified determinants and highlights their complemen-
tary nature in enabling DCs and creating adaptability.
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Figure 1: Overview of the determinants for dynamic capabilities
3.3 Dynamic Capabilities of Hidden Champions
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one study that specifically examines HCs in the
context of the DCV. Rammer and Spielkamp (2019) follow the classification of Teece et al.
(1997) and focus their investigation on processes, paths, and positions as dimensions of DCs
and determinants of business strategies. They argue that these elements represent substantial
factors that differentiate HCs from their competitors and build the foundation of their success.
In a subsequent empirical analysis, they show that HCs emphasize new technologies, open in-
novation strategies, and investments in a well-skilled workforce. The authors conclude that
these features enable HCs to develop organizational DCs and to create difficult-to-replicate
competitive advantages. These findings provide first insights for an investigation of the DC
indicators presented in the previous section.
In the context of innovation competence, there seems to be a broad consensus that HCs show
superior innovation performance in comparison to other SMEs and large corporations (Pittrof
2011; Simon 2012; Rammer & Spielkamp 2015; Schmieder 2018). Even though empirical find-
ings show no clear pattern regarding the R&D intensity of HCs compared to non-HCs, there is
general agreement that HCs exhibit more efficient innovation processes. According to Simon
(2018), HCs do not only hold more patents than large R&D intensive firms but also show sig-
nificantly lower cost per patent9. Empirical research further shows that HCs have significantly
9 The cost of a patent is defined as the total sum of costs beginning with the idea stage until a successful patent
grant. According to Simon (2012), HCs have costs of approx. 0.5 million Euros per patent, whereas large corpo-
rations spent 2.7 billion Euros per successful patent filing. The average number of patents per employee is 31
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higher revenue shares from innovations than other firms (Rammer & Spielkamp 2019). Supe-
rior technological know-how and high vertical integration as well as deep customer knowledge
are often cited as the main drivers of their innovation capability (Simon 2012; Rammer &
Spielkamp 2015). The combination of these factors enables HCs to bring new ideas faster to
the market and increase their ability to sense potential threats and seize opportunities earlier
than the competitors, allowing them to maintain leading market positions.
Yet, digitalization may change the paradigms of innovations. Digital innovations that go be-
yond digitizing analogue processes, often require different approaches towards innovation.
Firms need to increasingly be able to generate radically new products and services that are
embedded in platforms. This transformation may be challenging for HCs who primarily focus
on incremental and continuous improvements of their existing portfolio. So far, there is no em-
pirical evidence that shows how this may affect the innovation capabilities of HCs and if their
existing technological competences and resources are sufficient to drive radical change. More-
over, in times of changing market structures, customer knowledge limited to their niche might
even impede their ability to sense and seize potentially disruptive development from outside
this locus. Nevertheless, B2B markets in which HCs are primarily active, significantly differ
from B2C markets in terms of customer requirements and process complexity (Simon 2019).
Their in-depth customer knowledge and expertise about these industrial processes could sup-
port HCs to keep their competitive edge by providing superior digital solutions.
A review of literature on HC leadership indicates a strong association with entrepreneurial
leadership styles (Pittrof 2011; Simon 2012; Hilz 2013). Empirical research suggests that their
leaders are driven by long-term visions which increases their propensity to rather focus on in-
novations and increase of market share instead of short-term cost reductions and profitability
(Rammer & Spielkamp 2015). Accordingly, they seem to be primarily driven by intrinsic mo-
tivation. Simon (2012) also emphasizes continuity as an important feature of HC leadership
leading to relatively few changes in top management positions. This top-level continuity allows
HC leaders to actively shape the firm’s mission and vision which establishes the credibility
necessary to inspire employees. At the same time, HC leaders thoroughly monitor firm perfor-
mance and stress strict compliance with the firm values to ensure that the entire organization is
geared for market leadership and growth. To achieve these ambitious goals, they emphasize
decentralized responsibilities and decision-making processes which promotes a culture of indi-
vidual accountability and autonomy (Pittrof 2011).
4 Key Variables, Data and Methodology 13
The (entrepreneurial) leadership attributes also define the organizational structures and pro-
cesses of HCs. Their decentralized and process-focused organization seems to facilitate collab-
oration across their functional units, leading to improved organizational agility. Moreover, it
distributes decision-making authority as well as responsibilities to individual units, which ena-
bles close direct customer relationships (Pittrof 2011; Simon 2012). Their focus on few niche
products and markets allows HCs to keep simple organizational structures and makes them less
prone to innovation inhibiting hierarchical and complex structures (Augier & Teece 2009). Si-
mon (2012) also argues that flexible and digitally backed processes help HCs to effectively
manage global businesses.
In summary, this literature review indicates that HCs demonstrate a superior innovation perfor-
mance, are led by entrepreneurial leaders, and show rather agile organizational structures and
processes. In the context of the previously identified DC determinants, this suggests that HCs
indeed exhibit superior DCs which differentiates them from other market actors. Even though
empirical research specifically targeting the impact of digitalization on HCs is limited, existing
literature suggests that HCs may also be able to demonstrate superior sensing, seizing, and re-
configuration of skills in times of digital transformation. Therefore, I hypothesize that hidden
champions are better prepared for the digital transformation than non-HC firms.
4 Key Variables, Data and Methodology
My main data source are the Mannheim Innovation Panel10 (MIP) survey waves 2016, 2017
and 2018. The MIP is the official German Innovation Survey (GIS) and represents the German
contribution to the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) of the European Commission. It of-
fers detailed representative firm information and is based on a stratified random sample of all
German firms with more than five employees in manufacturing and business-oriented service
industries. Each year approximately 7,000 to 8,500 firms provide data with a focus on their
10 The MIP is a yearly survey conducted by the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), the Fraunhofer
Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), and the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (infas). It is
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and gathers information on
the innovation activities of German firms. The survey allows for extrapolation of the survey results to the total
firm population. Every two years, the MIP is part of the CIS of the Statistical Office of the European Commission
(EUROSTAT) which serves as the basis for the European Innovation Statistic (ZEW 2019). See, e.g., Rammer
and Peters (2013) or visit ‘https://www.zew.de/en/research-at-zew/mannheim-innovation-panel-innovation-ac-
tivities-of-german-enterprises’ for general information about the MIP. See Appendix A.1 for an extract of the
survey 2016.
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innovation activities. The 2016 survey contains information on the current state of digitaliza-
tion of 6,498 firms in mid-2016. All remaining survey questions of interest to this study refer
to the end of the previous calendar year. Hence, I use the survey of 2016 to obtain information
about firm size, age, and industry affiliation for the reference year 2015. Due to slight changes
in the queried firm information every two years, only the MIP 2017 provides enough infor-
mation to identify HCs within the sample. The 2018 survey provides information on the levels
of my main outcome variables measured for the year 2017. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship
between the survey years and the variables of interest graphically.
Figure 2: Survey waves, reference years and primary data
4.1 Hidden Champions and Control Group Firms
Since there is no publicly available list of German HCs, I use a subsample of previously iden-
tified HCs within the MIP by Wittenstein (2019) to investigate their digital preparedness. Based
on a full sample of 307 HCs and 10,786 non-HCs, I am able to extract 116 HCs and 3,645 non-
HCs that have participated in the survey wave 2016 and provide information on firm digitali-
zation. The remaining firms do not provide all information that is necessary for a classification
and, thus, are not included for further analysis.11 Figure 3 summarizes the sample structure.
11 In terms of age, size and industry classes, the ‘unclassified’ firms do not statistically differ from the sample
that is used for the analysis. The mean difference in age of 0.046 years and the mean difference in employees of
132 can both be rejected at the 10% level. However, sample firms seem to be 5.6% more likely to be in the
wholesale and trade industry, 10.07% more likely to operate in the information and communication sector, and
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Figure 3: Number of hidden champions, non-hidden champions in the sample
Notes: This figure presents the firm classification based on
MIP wave 2017. Due to incomplete overlap with survey wave
2016, which provides information on firm digitalization, the
sample reduces to 6,498 observations.
The industry sector distribution12 of HCs in the sample reveals that HCs almost exclusively
operate within manufacturing related industries. Only 4 of the 116 identified HCs are located
outside manufacturing (NACE2 10-33). One operates in wholesale and retail trade (NACE 45-
47), another in transportation and storage (NACE 49-53), and two in the area of professional,
scientific and technical activities (NACE2 69-75). Overall, this observation matches previous
studies that show a similar industry concentration of HCs (e.g., Venohr & Meyer 2007; Simon
2012; Rammer & Spielkamp 2015).
Control group approach
This highly skewed distribution towards manufacturing-related industries indicates that a sim-
ple comparison between HCs and non-HCs may not yield meaningful results. Moreover, to
adequately analyze HC-specific features and capabilities, age and size distributions also need
to be considered. To ensure that such structural characteristics do not affect my subsequent
analysis, I use an entropy balance13 approach. This multivariate reweighting method was first
12 See Table C.1 in the appendix for the detailed industry distribution. As most HCs operate in manufacturing, I
apply a more fine-grained industry classification, which allows to distinguish between several manufacturing-
related sectors, for the analysis. The table also presents the corresponding NACE2 values.
13 Hainmueller and Xu (2013) provide additional information about the approach and its advantages over earlier
control group methods, such as nearest neighbor or propensity score matching techniques that often yield rather
low levels of covariate balance.
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described by Hainmueller (2012) and allows to “reweight a dataset such that the covariate dis-
tributions in the reweighted data satisfy a set of specified moment conditions” (Hainmueller &
Xu 2013, p. 1). Accordingly, I apply MIP data on firm age, number of full-time employees, and
industry affiliation of firms at the end of 2015 as covariates for the entropy balance approach.
By assigning weights to each non-HC I obtain a synthetic control group whose mean, variance,
and skewness across these covariates complies with the distribution observed for HCs.14 Table
1 illustrates how this reweighting of non-HCs improves the structural similarities with HCs.
Without entropy balance, HCs and non-HCs significantly differ in terms of firm age and size.
By applying entropy balancing weights, these differences reduce to marginal levels, creating a
highly similar control group.
Table 1: Comparison of HCs, non-HCs, and control group firms
An investigation of the standardized differences between HCs and control group firms (cf. Ta-
ble C.2 in the appendix) confirms the validity of the approach. The results show no signs of
imbalance in terms of size, age, and industry distribution. After entropy balancing all differ-
ences are statistically not different from zero (Normand et al. 2001). Support also comes from
graphical illustrations of the density distribution (cf. Figures B.1 – B.3 in the appendix).
4.2 Firm Digital Readiness
Another critical component for the investigation in this study is the development of a valid
measurement for firm digitalization. In total, the MIP survey of 2016 contains 11 questions15
about the usage of digital technologies and applications grouped into four main clusters. Firms
are asked to indicate the current prevalence of each individual application area within their
organization based on a 4-point Likert scale. The answering possibilities include no use at all
14 See Table C.2 in the appendix for the covariate balance table of all applied balancing variables of HCs and
control group firms before and after the reweighting created by Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu
2013). The table also includes the mean, variance, and skewness for all variables as well as the standardized
differences after the entropy balancing.
15 See Appendix A.1 for an extract of the survey 2016.
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Employees 2015 821.87 20 25.000 260,739 0 317,764 821,929 0 317,764
Year of foundation 1968.447 1775 2012 1981.589 1352 2016 1968.184 1352 2016




Notes: Employees 2015 refers to the number of full-time employees at the end of year 2015. For a complete overview of all variables used for entropy
balance, inlcluding their mean, variance, and skewness before and after the balancing, see Table C.2 in the appendix.
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(0), low use (1), medium use (2), and high use (3). Taken together, the four clusters cover some
of the most crucial aspects of firm digitalization and provide a solid indicator for the digital
readiness of a firm. The 11 questions are specifically designed to capture the prevalence of
digital applications within the entire spectrum of the economy (Rammer 2017). Therefore, the
specific application fields of the digital technologies are defined relatively broadly so that they
apply to firms of different size and industry backgrounds.
Digital readiness components
The first cluster covers four questions about the internal as well as external digital connected-
ness of firms. In particular, firms are asked to state the level of digital interconnectivity (1)
within production/service provision, (2) between production/service provision and logistics, (3)
with their customers, and (4) with their suppliers. These questions are closely related to the
concept of industry 4.016, which describes the increasing interconnectivity and exchange of
information driven by digital technologies, such as the internet of things (Lichtblau et al. 2015).
The second cluster evaluates a firm’s digital capabilities in the context of its internal organiza-
tion and communication. Firms are specifically asked to indicate the prevalence of (5) tele-
working possibilities for their employees, (6) software-based communication, and (7) intranet-
based platforms. This cluster serves as an indicator for digitally enabled collaboration capabil-
ities of the firm (Digital Intelligence Institute 2015; Berghaus et al. 2016). The third cluster
considers digital capabilities in sales and external communication and specifically targets the
firm’s (8) use of e-commerce and its (9) social media engagement. Both activities are major
aspects in creating digital customer experience (Berghaus et al. 2016; IW Consult 2018). More-
over, they may enable new distribution channels and additional information sources that can
enhance the firm’s operations and create potential for new business models. The fourth cluster
analyzes the firm’s information processing capabilities in terms of the prevalence of (10) cloud
applications and (11) big data analysis. Cloud services can not only significantly increase effi-
ciency and reduce fixed costs for firms, but also grant access to more processing power that is
necessary to analyze customer information. Lenka et al. (2016, p. 96) argue that analytic capa-
bility encompasses “the ability to transform the data available at hand into valuable insights
and actionable directives for the company”. In other words, firms that are able to analyze data
packages via big data analysis capabilities, have better access to information that can create
new business opportunities and support innovation (Bharadwaj et al. 2013).
16 For more information about the concept of Industry 4.0 see, e.g., BMWi (2017a).
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Creating a digital readiness index
While many studies try to cover organizational aspects that are affected by digitalization17, the
digital readiness index used in this paper focuses on particular digital resources and capabilities
that are required for more sophisticated digital endeavors. To operationalize the digital readi-
ness of firms, I use the individual values from all questions on digitalization and create an ad-
ditive index that is normalized to values between 0 and 1. A total Cronbach’s alpha of .8918 of
the 11 items is well above the suggested threshold of Cortina (1993) and, thus, indicates a high
internal consistency of the items. Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)19 measure of sam-
pling adequacy shows solid values with all items being well above the 0.8 threshold. The low
p-value of the Bartlett test of sphericity indicates that the null hypothesis of uncorrelated vari-
ables can be rejected.20 An explorative principal factor analysis21 (PFA) produces a single fac-
tor with an eigenvalue larger than 1. According to the Kaiser criterion, only one factor is re-
tained (Mooi et al. 2018). A scree plot analysis22 confirms this result and graphically shows that
an additional factor does not significantly increase the explained variance. The retained factor
explains roughly 88% of the variance of the individual items. All 11 factor loadings have the
same sign and values above 0.6, which indicates that all variables from the questionnaire may
be used to describe the retained factor (Cleff 2015). The results suggest that all 11 items can be
combined in one index that describes firm-level digitalization. Hence, I create an index variable
comprising the sum of the 11 individual survey responses of each firm. For interpretation pur-
poses, this index is then normalized to values between 0 and 123. A digital readiness score of 0
indicates that the respective firm does not engage in any digitalization activity at all. Corre-
spondingly, firms that reach the maximum index score of 1 must emphasize a high prevalence
17 These may include a firm’s strategy, leadership, culture, customer experience, products and processes, and
technologies (e.g., WiWo & Neuland 2015; Berghaus et al. 2017; Capgemini Consulting & MIT Sloan
Management 2017; Microsoft 2017; IW Consult 2018). Moreover, IW Consult (2016) provides a good overview
of studies that have measured digitalization in the context of SMEs.
18 See Table C.3 in the appendix to this chapter for all individual alpha values.
19 See Table C.3 in the appendix for all individual KMO values.
20 The Bartlett test shows a Chi-square of 19,018.94 and a corresponding p-value of 0.000. Therefore, the null
hypothesis that variables are not intercorrelated can be rejected.
21 PFA is frequently applied to identify hypothetical higher order factors that explain individual items. I applied
this method instead of a principal component analysis, as the latter requires the strict assumption that all variance
in the data is common variance. PFA on the other hand allows for unique variances and attempts to partition the
common variance (Cleff 2015; Mooi et al. 2018). See Table C.4 in the appendix for an overview of the results
of the factor analysis.
22 Figure B.4 in the appendix shows the respective scree plot.
23 See Figure B.5 in the appendix for the distribution of the digital readiness variable.
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for each of the 11 surveyed applications and technologies within their firms. This makes it a
suitable tool for my empirical analysis on a firm’s preparedness towards digital transformation.
Description of firm digital readiness
Table 2 presents the mean values for each item within the digital readiness index as well as the
average digital readiness across all classified firms in the sample. Among all four clusters, the
digitization of production and service processes seems to be the most common and prevalent
cluster of firm digitalization activities. This indicates that the sample firms are rather advanced
in terms of establishing digital connectivity within their organizations as well as to customers
and suppliers. By comparison, the fourth cluster on the prevalence of information processing
capabilities shows the lowest scores within the index. This area seems to be either of lower
importance to the firms in the sample or may describe more sophisticated digital applications
that firms struggle to implement. Since the second and third cluster also show on average much
lower scores compared to the first cluster, firms may also find it more difficult to assess their
capabilities related to rather specific applications.
Table 2: Description of the digital readiness index and all items
The average total digital index score is highly dependent on a firm’s industry affiliation. Table
3 on the following page shows that the information and communication sector (0.517) and firms
in financial and insurance activities (0.430) demonstrate the highest average digital readiness
Variable Range Mean Std. dev. Observations
Joint digital readiness index 0-11 0.322 0.218 3,761
Production and/or provision of services
(1) Digital connectedness within production and/or provision of services 0-32 1,565 1,067 3,775
(2) Digital connectedness between production and/or provision of services and logistics 0-3 1,286 1,079 3,775
(3) Digital connectedness with customers 0-3 1,472 1,006 3,773
(4) Digital connectedness with suppliers 0-3 1,253 0.968 3,771
Internal organization and communication
(5) Teleworking 0-3 0.728 0.911 3,773
(6) Software-based communication (Skype etc.) 0-3 0.896 0.967 3,773
(7) Intranet-based platforms (Wikis etc.) 0-3 0.840 0.973 3,774
Sales and external communications
(8) E-commerce 0-3 0.741 0.897 3,774
(9) Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) 0-3 0.660 0.858 3,775
Information processing
(10) Cloud applications 0-3 0.686 0.903 3,775
(11) Analysis of Big Data 0-3 0.473 0.778 3,776
Notes: 1 Scale is normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 0=no digital readiness and  1=complete digital readiness.
2 Scale ranges from 0 to 3. Based on the the survey questions 0=no usage, 1=low usage, 2=medium usage, 3=high usage of the respective technology.
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scores. With an average score of 0.379, manufacturing of transport equipment follows by a
clear margin and represents the only non-service focused sector among the three most digital-
ized industries. At the lower end, firms in agriculture, forestry, and fishing show the lowest
observed scores (0.045). However, as the sample only contains two firms in this industry, gen-
eralizability may be limited. Firms engaging in real estate activities (0.133) and construction
business (0.182) perform slightly better and complement the bottom three industry sectors.
Table 3: Digital readiness across industries
The sector differences in Table 3 largely reflect findings in previous studies on digitalization
(Berghaus et al. 2016; BMWi 2017b). However, research presents ambiguous findings on the
levels of firm digitalization and the status within manufacturing-related industries in particular.
Whereas some studies highlight relative shortcomings within these sectors (e.g., Digital
Intelligence Institute 2015; Capgemini Consulting 2017), others support the patterns presented
in this analysis and emphasize above average levels of firm digitalization in manufacturing-
related sectors (IW Consult 2018). In the end, these discrepancies may simply occur due to
differences in the measurement approach, industry classifications, or survey designs. Therefore,
comparability between digitalization indicators and measurements might be limited.
Class Sectors (NACE2) Mean Std. dev. Firms
1 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (01-03) 0.045 0.021 2
2 Mining, quarrying, and other industries (05-09; 35-39) 0.247 0.190 332
3 Manufacture of food products, beverages, tobacco products, textiles, apparel, leather, andrelated products (10-15) 0.230 0.178 278
4 Manufacture of wood and paper products and printing (16-18) 0.320 0.201 168
5 Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum products, chemicals, chemical products,pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical, and botanical products (19-21) 0.298 0.198 96
6 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products, mineral products, basic metals and fabricatedmetal products, except machinery and equipment (22-25) 0.283 0.191 423
7 Manufacture of computer, electronic, optical products, and electrical equipment (26-27) 0.369 0.187 265
8 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28) 0.359 0.191 173
9 Manufacture of transport equipment (29-30) 0.379 0.232 66
10 Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment (31-33) 0.307 0.224 212
11 Construction (41-43) 0.182 0.178 36
12 Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food serviceactivities (45-47; 49-53;55-56) 0.279 0.216 421
13 Information and communication (58-63) 0.517 0.221 281
14 Financial and insurance activities (64-66) 0.430 0.227 123
15 Real estate activities (68) 0.133 0.097 5
16 Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities (69-75; 77-82) 0.331 0.219 877
17 Public administration, defense, education, human health, and social work activities (84-88) - - 0
18 Other services (89-99) 0.343 0.31 3
Average/total 0.322 0.218 3.761
Note: 1 Scale is normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 0=no digital readiness and  1=full digital readiness.
Digital readiness index1
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Previous studies also indicate that differences in the level of digitalization are influenced by
firm size (Berghaus et al. 2017; IW Consult 2018). The presented findings mainly support this
assumption. Table 4 on the following page shows that firms with less than 20 employees have
the lowest average digital readiness score with 0.272. The average score steadily increases with
firm size and reaches an average maximum of 0.510 for firms with more than 1,000 employees.
High upfront investment costs for digital infrastructure, technologies and software may partially
explain this observation. Large firms may simply have more financial resources that allow them
to invest in digitalization and, consequently, improve their digital readiness score.
Table 4: Digital readiness and firm size
In terms of firm age, studies find that start-up companies are amongst the most digitalized firms
despite often being relatively small in size (e.g., Berghaus et al. 2017; IW Consult 2018). My
findings support such a relationship and shows that the youngest firms achieve the highest av-
erage digital readiness scores. As illustrated in Table 5, firms that are younger than 8 years old
show the highest average score of 0.349. With an increase in age, the scores continuously de-
crease and reach a low of 0.307 for firms that are older than 40 years. Two reasons may explain
this relationship. First, start-up companies tend to utilize and emphasize digitally geared busi-
ness models. Second, young firms rarely face organizational inertia that may impede digitali-
zation efforts in more established firms (e.g., Berghaus et al. 2017; IW Consult 2018). However,
the overall differences are rather small compared to the effect of firm size. This indicates that
firm age may not be such a crucial factor when it comes to digital readiness in my sample.
Size classes Mean Std. dev. Firms
Fewer than 20 employees 0.272 0.217 1,815
20-49 employees 0.320 0.217 778
50-99 employees 0.349 0.202 457
100-249 employees 0.384 0.21 368
250-499 employees 0.394 0.186 159
500-999 employees 0.454 0.171 99
1,000 and more employees 0.510 0.19 85
Average/total 0.322 0.218 3,761
Digital readiness index1
Note: 1 Scale is normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 0=no digital readiness and  1=complete digital readiness.
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Table 5: Digital readiness and firm age
Overall, the analyses provide consistent patterns for firm-level digitalization based on the dig-
ital readiness index and match previous findings on the impact of structural firm characteristics
on digitalization levels. This supports the validity of the index as a reliable indicator for firm
digital readiness.
4.3 Outcome Variables and Summary Statistics
In general, there is broad consensus that innovation is vital for a firm’s long-term performance
and competitiveness (e.g., Tushman & O’Reilly III 1996; Jansen et al. 2006; Christensen et al.
2015; OECD 2018b). Previous studies show that a higher level of digitalization positively cor-
relates with the innovation activities of firms (Sambamurthy et al. 2003; Kleis et al. 2012; IW
Consult 2016, 2018). Investments in digital technologies can enable firms to develop new pro-
cesses, products and services, and may even lead to business model innovations. Studies also
present evidence for a positive impact of digitalization on economic performance indicators. In
particular, higher levels of digitalization within firms may significantly increase work produc-
tivity (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011; IW Consult 2018) and are associated with higher levels of
revenue growth (Schröder et al. 2015).
The MIP survey 2018 provides information on the levels of three main innovation indicators
for the reference year 2017. In particular, firms are asked to state the share of revenues in 2017
derived from innovations that were introduced in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. Moreover,
firms are specifically requested to state the share of revenues from market novelties, which
serves as an indicator for radical innovation capabilities of a firm. The survey also contains
information on the share of revenues from more incremental innovations introduced in the same
period. This includes innovations that are primarily based on existing products and services but
still represent significant improvements. Compared to an investigation of innovation capabili-
ties based on patent filings, these variables allow to measure the success of firm innovations in
Firm age groups Mean Std. dev. Firms
Younger than 8 years 0.349 0.227 265
8-15 years 0.342 0.228 632
16-25 years 0.323 0.219 1,186
26-40 years 0.312 0.211 846
More than 40 years 0.307 0.211 824
Average/total 0.322 0.218 3,753
Digital readiness index1
Note: 1 Scale is normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 0=no digital readiness and  1=complete digital readiness.
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the market. To investigate the effect of digital readiness on the economic performance of firms,
I use MIP data on firm revenues and employees. This allows to calculate productivity per em-
ployee which serves as an indicator for firm efficiency. To reduce skewness and ease interpret-
ability, its log-transformed variable is used as dependent variable. Finally, I use information on
firm revenues to calculate the revenue growth rate (in %) from 2016 to 2017.
Table 6: Summary statistics of input and outcome variables
The summary statistic for the share of revenues from all types of innovations in Table 6 shows
an average share of revenues of 6.37% and reveals that some firms generate up to 100% of their
revenues from products and services that are younger than three years. The median value of
zero indicates, that most firms do not generate any revenues from innovation. This suggests
that, at least in this period, they did not introduce any product innovations to the market. Fur-
thermore, the low average share of revenues from radical innovations (1.265%) compared to
the average share of revenues from incremental innovations (4.882%) implies that the total
share of revenues from innovations is mainly driven by improvements of existing solutions
rather than by radically new products or services.24 The difference in observations between the
three innovation indicators is the result of partially incomplete survey information regarding
24 Research emphasizes that incremental innovation activities are much more predictable and less risky than
radical innovation efforts. Thus, they account for the most part of all innovation activities (e.g., Leifer et al.
2000).
Variable Description Min. Max. Median Mean Obs.
Independent
Hidden champion
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a firm is a Hidden
Champion and 0 for non-HCs 0 1 0 0.031 3,761
Digital readiness (2016)
Normalized index with scores between 0 (no digital readiness at
all)  and 1 (highest possible digital readiness score) 0 1 0.303 0.322 3,761
Dependent
Innovation performance indicators (2017)
Share of revenues from all innovations
(%) Share of revenues in 2017 from products or services that are
new to the firm or new to the market and were introduced
between 2015-2017
0 100 0 6.370 2,141
Share of revenues from incremental innovations
(%) Share of revenues in 2017 from products or services that are
new to the firm and were introduced between 2015-2017 0 100 0 4.882 2,119
Share of revenues from radical innovations
(%) Share of revenues in 2017 from products or services that are
new to the market and were introduced between 2015-2017 0 100 0 1.265 2,133
Financial performance indicators (2017)
Productivity
Logarithm of a firm's productivity measured as revenues per full-
time employee 2017 8.958 14.197 11.608 11.663 2,169
Revenue growth (%) Change in revenues from 2016 to 2017 -100 137.32 1.818 2.601 1,748
Note: The difference in observations results from incomplete survey data.
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firm innovation activities. The average revenue growth rate from 2016 to 2017 of all sample
firms is 2.6%. Almost 1% of firms report a total loss of their revenues from 2016 to 2017. This
does not necessarily imply that these firms went bankrupt but could also indicate high depend-
ency on project-driven businesses. Due to irregular panel participation and panel mortality, only
about 30% of the firms that participated in at least one of the three survey waves 2016 to 2018
responded in all three survey waves. This significantly reduces the number of observations that
can be used for the empirical analysis and explains the differences in observation sizes.
4.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation (2SLS)
Endogeneity concerns in the context of digitalization-related measurements are a major chal-
lenge for empirical investigations on their performance effects. For example, one could argue
that differences in innovation performance is the result of different strategic and cultural align-
ments. If firms intentionally focus on innovation strength, they may be more likely to invest in
new technologies that can lay the foundations for future innovation success. In such cases, su-
perior innovation performance could cause higher levels of firm digitalization. A similar issue
applies to growth and productivity effects. Superior economic performance often results in bet-
ter resources which can be used for investments in digitalization. In all these cases, the coeffi-
cient reflecting the impact of the digital readiness index in the ordinary least squares (OLS)
would be inconsistent and positively biased. Therefore, the correlations between digital readi-
ness and the outcome variable in the OLS are likely to be biased and do not allow for causal
interpretation.
To address these endogeneity concerns, I follow Brynjolfsson (2011) and apply a two-stage
least square analysis (2SLS) with broadband availability as instrumental variable (IV). The of-
ficial statistics database of the German states (INKAR)25 constantly gathers information about
the percentage of German households in each county with at least 50MBits Internet access. By
matching the information on Internet access with the addresses of the firms in the MIP, I receive
an indicator of ‘broadband access’ for each firm based on the administrative district level. With
regard to the necessary requirements as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008), access to
broadband Internet26 is a valid instrument. First, broadband availability needs fulfill the rele-
25 For additional information about the database visit www.inkar.de.
26 One could argue that this indicator may not perfectly describe the actual broadband access for every firm. In
particular, larger firms may enforce contracts to ensure broadband access in otherwise isolated areas. Despite
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vance assumption and have explanatory power for firm digital readiness. It seems highly plau-
sible that access to broadband Internet is a prerequisite for digital readiness. Almost any digital
application and technology is dependent on a (fast) connection to the Internet and firms without
access to broadband Internet face serious challenges in establishing digital readiness. A high
correlation (.1056) between both variables confirms this notion. Second, the exclusion re-
striction requires that broadband availability should only affect firm performance via digital
readiness. It seems implausible that access to broadband affects any performance indicator other
than through increased firm-level digitalization. Access to the Internet alone does not provide
added value to firms and performance effects can only be obtained by improved digital capa-
bilities. Third, the exchangeability assumption needs to be met, requiring that broadband access
and outcome variables do not share common causes. Although the instrument may be related
to regional economic performance as well-performing regions may attract more investments
from infrastructure providers, it can be assumed that broadband access is exogenous to a single
firm’s performance. Moreover, data suggest that the instrument seems to be primarily influ-
enced by population density (BBSR 2012).
In summary, this provides strong indication that even the by definition untestable exchangea-
bility assumption and exclusion restriction (Becker 2016) hold and, thus, support for the valid-
ity of the broadband as an instrument for digital readiness. The following system of equations
summarizes the empirical strategy of my IV estimations:
First stage: Digital readiness i,2016  = a 0 + a 1 Broadband i,2016 + a 2 HC i +(a 3 X i) + u i
Second stage: Outcome i,2017 = b 0 + b 1 Digital readiness i,2016 + b 2 HC i + (b 3 X i) + v i,
With Digital readiness i,2016 measuring firm i’s digital readiness score and Broadband i,2016 indi-
cating the number of households with broadband Internet access in firm i’s administrative dis-
trict in 2016. HC i is a constant dummy variable classifying each firm i into either HC or non-
HC. Outcome i,2017 refers to firm i’s innovation and financial performance in the year 2017. The
equations include a set of regional control variables X i  that are used for robustness tests in
Chapter 5.4.
these potential issues, the broadband access indicator should still provide a suitable measure for the availability
of fast Internet for the on average rather small firms in the sample.
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Testing IV requirements
Econometrics highlights several testing approaches to evaluate an instrument’s validity based
on the relevance assumption. First, the first-stage estimators reveal potential correlation be-
tween the IV and the endogenous regressor. Second, the Kleibergen and Paap (KP) rk LM sta-
tistic (Kleibergen & Paap 2006) tests if the excluded instruments are relevant (i.e., if they are
correlated with the endogenous regressor). Third, the KP Wald F statistic indicates the strength
of the correlation (Kleibergen & Paap 2006), with test statistics above 10 usually considered as
minimum requirement for strong IVs (e.g., Stock et al. 2002; Angrist & Pischke 2008). If the
IV fails any of these criteria, it is considered being ‘weak’ and, accordingly, may yield even
more biased estimates than the ordinary OLS (Wooldridge 2013).
The results (cf., Tables 7 and 8) show a highly significant first-stage coefficient for the broad-
band access on digital readiness. Moreover, both the underidentification test (KP rk LM) and
the weak identification test (KP Wald F) indicate a strong instrument. In particular, for all first-
stage regressions, the respective KP Wald F statistics are well above the threshold value of 10.
The underidentification tests of all models can be rejected at the 1% level. Conditional on the
exclusion restriction and exchangeability assumption, these findings suggest that broadband
access is a valid instrument and the 2SLS should yield consistent and less biased estimates as
compared to the OLS.
5 Results and Discussion
This section provides the results of the empirical analysis. First, the effect of digital readiness
on firm innovation and economic performance is discussed. Second, I provide a comparison of
digital readiness scores between HCs and non-HCs with similar structural characteristics. The
section concludes with a discussion of several robustness tests.
5.1 Digital Readiness and Innovation Performance Indicators
Overall, the findings in Table 7 provide strong evidence for a statistically significant and sub-
stantial positive impact of the digital readiness index score on innovation. For the baseline
model, both OLS (1a) and 2SLS (1b) show large and positive coefficients for the digital readi-
ness index variable on the revenue from all innovations in 2017. The results of the IV estimation
in model (1b) indicate that a 10 percentage points increase in digital readiness increases the
share of revenues from innovations by 5.43%. Even though the IV coefficient has the same sign
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as the OLS coefficient, the effect size of the 2SLS has more than doubled. Accordingly, the
OLS regression does not show a positive bias, but in fact understates the actual effect of digital
readiness. There are two probable reasons that may explain why the IV estimates are signifi-
cantly larger than the effect indicated by OLS.
The digital readiness score might suffer from measurement error which would bias the OLS
towards zero. Since the digital readiness score is based on a self-evaluation, measurement error
cannot be excluded. Moreover, the survey does not allow for ‘don’t know’- answers which may
induce respondents to make non-accurate statements about their digital readiness, either by ac-
cident or simply because they cannot relate to a particular question. This likely leads to OLS
coefficients that understate the effect of digital readiness. Assuming that the IV is uncorrelated
with the measurement error, 2SLS will yield larger coefficients in such cases. Although un-
likely, an omitted variable that is negatively correlated with both digital readiness and the out-
come variables could also lead to a downward bias of OLS estimates. Since 2SLS regressions
are specifically used to solve these issues, it appears possible that IV estimates suggest larger
effects (Card 2001; Wooldridge 2013; Becker 2016).
Yet, differences in the described effects seem most likely to cause this discrepancy. Whereas
OLS regression aims at the average treatment effect (ATE) that describes the effect of a one-
unit increase of digital readiness on the outcome for all firms in the sample, 2SLS regressions
yield a local average treatment effect (LATE) for firms whose digital readiness was actually
affected by the instrument only. In the case at hand, diminishing returns of digital readiness on
(innovation) performance may partially explain the negative bias of OLS estimates. An increase
at the bottom of the digital readiness index may have a larger effect on performance than the
same increase at higher digital readiness scores. This seems reasonable considering that already
basic digital technologies and tools enable firms to significantly decrease turnaround times and
reduce the cost of information-intensive processes up to 90% (Markovitch & Willmott 2014;
Isaksson et al. 2018). Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that broadband Internet access has
an effect on digital readiness scores especially for those firms that show relatively low levels
of digitalization and where a one-unit increase has a large effect on performance. This return
might be very different from the effect of a one-unit increase of digital readiness for firms that
already show higher levels of digitalization (Card 2001; Becker 2016).
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Even though these claims cannot be tested, they provide a plausible explanation for the find-
ings.27 Models (2a) and (2b) include a HC dummy variable, showing that effect sizes remain
stable and significant. The 2SLS in model (2b) reports only a slight decrease to 5.28 percentage
points more innovation-based revenues for every 10-percentage point increase in digital readi-
ness. Moreover, model estimates do not indicate a statistically significant effect of being a HC
on innovation outcomes. This may suggest that HCs indeed do not show higher levels of reve-
nues from innovations compared to control group firms when digital readiness is held constant.
Yet, the more plausible reason is that my relatively small number of HC observations imply a
small sample bias, leading to low statistical power for the estimates. Support for this view
comes from an analysis of the effect of digital readiness for the subsamples of control group
firms and HC firms.28 The results indicate that the coefficient in the full sample is mainly driven
by the effect of digital readiness on innovation for control group firms. I do not find a statisti-
cally significant effect of digital readiness within the HC subsample which may explain why a
test of equality of coefficients29 between the two subsamples cannot be rejected.
Table 7 further provides information on the impact of digital readiness on innovation types and
their respective revenue share. In particular, models (3a) and (3b) show its impact on the share
of revenues from incremental innovations. Whereas the OLS (3a) indicates a statistically sig-
nificant coefficient of the digital readiness variable, the positive effect disappears in the 2SLS
model (3b). Hence, the model is unable to provide evidence for a significant effect of digital
readiness on incremental innovation output of a firm. Besides of a small sample bias, it may be
the case that digital applications and technologies do not improve incremental innovation ca-
pabilities of firms but especially foster their ability to generate radically new innovations.
The results of models (4a) and (4b) provide support for this assumption. Both OLS and IV
estimates show a positive and significant effect of digital readiness on the share of revenues
from radical innovations. Confirming previous findings in models (1b) and (2b), the OLS again
underestimates the effect of digital readiness. This positive impact of digital readiness on radi-
cal innovation capabilities is an important finding in the context of preparedness towards digital
27 Although unlikely (see exchangeability assumption in the previous section), an omitted variable that is nega-
tively correlated with both digital readiness and the outcome variables could also lead to a downward bias of
OLS estimates. Since 2SLS regressions are specifically used to solve these issues, it appears possible that IV
estimates suggest larger effects.
28 See Table C.5 in the appendix for the OLS and 2SLS regressions of the effect of digital readiness on revenue
from all types of innovation for the HC and control group firm subsamples.
29 See Tables C.4 in the appendix for the results of the ‘Chow test’ (Chow 1960) of equality of coefficients
between models.
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transformation. It shows that by improving their digital capabilities, firms may be able to gen-
erate more radical (digital) innovations that rely less on already established expertise. The ef-
fects are also economically significant. For every 10 percentage point increase in digital readi-
ness, firms can improve the share of revenues from radical innovations by 2.64 percentage
points. Assuming that some of these (radical) innovation are digital-based or at least digitally
enhanced, this could indicate that companies can substantially improve their digital prepared-
ness by increasing investments in digital technologies and capabilities. Consistent with findings
in models (2a) and (2b), I am unable to observe a significant HC effect on both the share of
revenues from incremental innovations and radical innovations. Moreover, the results of an
investigation of the subsamples yield similar insights, indicating that the sample size for the
HC subsample impedes statistical significance. In both cases the test of equality of effect sizes
of digital readiness between HCs and control group firms cannot be rejected.30
In summary, the large positive and significant effect of digital readiness on the share of reve-
nues from innovation (1b) and radical innovation (3b) in particular confirms previous research
(Bouwman et al. 2018) and shows that investments in digitalization lead to better innovation
performance. Moreover, it provides support for my assumptions in the context of the digital
readiness index. Digital connectedness to suppliers and customers as well as software-based
communication platforms may improve collaboration and information exchange within a firm
and to external (innovation) partners. Together with information processing capabilities, like
big data analyses, this may foster the creation of new knowledge which is a crucial requirement
for all innovation efforts. Even though my small HC sample size leads to low statistical power
and impede an investigation on possible differences in effect sizes between HCs and control
group firms, I find no reason to believe that the digital readiness effect size differs between HCs
and structurally similar control group firms.
30 See Tables C.5 and C.6 in the appendix for the OLS and 2SLS regressions of the effect of digital readiness on
the share of revenues based on incremental innovation and radical innovation, respectively, for the HC and con-







Innovation performance indicators (in % of revenue 2017)






OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Digital readiness 25.050*** 54.264** 24.460*** 52.761** 13.058*** 27.389 11.066* 26.414***
(5.656) (21.762) (5.862) (22.288) (5.018) (21.531) (5.906) (8.656)
Hidden champion 2.318 1.276 2.852 2.311 0.125 -0.460
(2.702) (2.896) (2.555) (2.747) (1.311) (1.269)
Constant 3.957* -7.063 3.043 -7.122 3.629** -1.467 -0.873 -6.326**

































Control group weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.065 -0.023 0.069 -0.013 0.032 0.005 0.080 -0.071
First-stage F statistic 28.464 23.589 22.200 22.231
Underidentification test 15.071 12.128 11.584 11.604
Observations 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,119 2,119 2,133 2,133
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table explores the effect of digital readiness and the HC dummy on financial performance indicators. The underidentification and weak identification (First-stage F
statistic) tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010).
Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
Table 7: OLS and 2SLS results for innovation performance indicators
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5.2 Digital Readiness and Economic Performance Indicators
Table 8 shows the results of the OLS and 2SLS regression for the impact of digital readiness
on productivity (1a to 2b) and revenue growth rates (3a to 4b). For firm productivity, I find that
in the baseline specification digital readiness increases the logarithm of productivity by 0.935
in the OLS (1a) and by 2.219 in the 2SLS instrumental variable regression (1b). In line with
findings for innovation performance, the OLS underestimates the true effect of digital readiness
on productivity. Again, the difference in effect sizes may be primarily attributed to the fact that
OLS (ATE) and 2SLS (LATE) describe different effects. The magnitude of the productivity
increase caused by digital readiness is remarkable. Already a 10 percentage points increase in
digital readiness results in an almost 25% increase in productivity.31 Similar to findings for
innovation performance, the coefficient of digital readiness decreases if the model takes the HC
effect into account. Model (2b) shows that it reduces the effect of a 10 percentage points in-
crease on productivity to roughly 21%.32 Contrary to my previous findings on innovation per-
formance, the model shows a significant positive effect of the HC dummy. Holding digital
readiness constant, HCs show a roughly 25% higher productivity compared to control group
firms.33 This is supported by previous studies that indicate similar HC advantages compared to
non-HCs in terms of productivity (Simon 2012; Rammer & Spielkamp 2019).
An investigation of the effect for HC and control group firm subsamples reveals that the in-
crease in productivity caused by higher levels of digital readiness in the full sample (2b) seems
to be mainly driven by the control group firm subsample.34 Due to small sample sizes in the
context of HCs, the model lacks statistical power to identify a significant effect size for the HC
subsample. In line with the statement in the previous section, the structural similarity between
HCs and control group firms indicates that a similar positive effect of digital readiness on
productivity should also hold for HCs. Overall, the results support the assumption that invest-
ments in digitalization can increase firm productivity by improving its efficiency (Brynjolfsson
et al. 2011; Barua et al. 2013; Saam et al. 2016; IW Consult 2018). On the one hand, it may
31 The coefficient of digital readiness in model (1b) is 2.219. As the variable ranges from 0 to 1, a 10 percentage
points higher digital readiness increases the logarithm of productivity by 0.2219. Accordingly, the exponentiated
value equals 1.2484 indicating a 24.8% increase in productivity.
32 The coefficient of digital readiness in model (2b) is 1.946. As the variable ranges from 0 to 1, a 10 percentage
points higher digital readiness increases the logarithm of productivity by 0.1946. Accordingly, the exponentiated
value equals 1.2148 indicating a 21.5% increase in productivity.
33 The coefficient of HC dummy in model (2b) is 0.223. Accordingly, its exponentiated value equals 1.250
indicating a 25% increase in productivity.
34 See Table C.8 in the appendix for the OLS and 2SLS regressions of the effect of digital readiness on produc-
tivity for the control group firm and HC subsamples.
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enable firms to decrease costs, for example by improving their internal and external digital
connectedness. This supports firms to automate tasks, processes or parts of the production, re-
sulting in significant time and production cost savings. Along similar lines, software-based
communication and intranet-based platforms can reduce cost of communication and ease the
information flow within firms as well as to their suppliers and customers. On the other hand,
an increase in digital readiness may develop new revenue streams while holding inputs (rela-
tively) constant. In particular, e-commerce and social media presence may improve customer
reach and provide additional distribution channels for products/services. Moreover, advanced
information processing capabilities and innovative solutions may allow firms to increase cus-
tomer value and, thus, allow them to enforce higher prices.
The regression results for the impact of digital readiness on firm revenue growth rate from 2016
to 2017 (3a to 4b), however, do not yield statistically significant estimates. While I find a sig-
nificant and strong effect in the OLS regressions in models (3a) and (4a), the respective IV
estimations are unable to provide statistically significant evidence (cf. models 3b and 4b). While
this could indicate that digital readiness indeed does not affect revenue growth, the more plau-
sible reason is a lack of statistical power in the model. Contrary to the other outcome variables,
revenue growth rate is based on information from two consecutive surveys and requires firms
to provide revenue data for 2016 and 2017 to be included in the analysis. This significantly
reduces the sample size. The results for the HC and control group subsamples illustrate similar
outcomes and show a significant effect of digital readiness on revenue growth rate only for
control group firm OLS estimates.35
35 See Table C.9 in the appendix for the OLS and 2SLS regressions of the effect of digital readiness on revenue






Economic performance indicators 2017
Productivity (log) Revenue growth rate
2016-2017 (in %)
OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Digital readiness 0.935*** 2.219*** 0.871*** 1.946*** 16.974** 9.670 16.848** 8.448
(0.200) (0.585) (0.225) (0.576) (6.961) (20.052) (6.910) (20.617)
Hidden champion 0.261*** 0.223*** 1.358 1.471
(0.073) (0.075) (2.822) (2.914)
Constant 11.687*** 11.192*** 11.583*** 11.188*** 0.217 2.973 -0.392 2.723































CG weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.087 -0.077 0.133 0.019 0.021 0.027 0.020 0.021
First-stage F statistic 32.983 27.242 25.864 23.930
Underidentification test 16.884 13.490 13.039 11.678
Observations 2,169 2,169 2,169 2,169 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table explores the effect of digital readiness and the HC dummy on financial performance indicators. The underidentification and weak identification (First-stage F
statistic) tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010).
Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
Table 8: OLS and 2SLS results for productivity and revenue growth rate
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5.3 Comparison of Digital Readiness Index Levels
A comparison of means for digital readiness in Table 9 shows that HCs have a significantly
higher average digital readiness index score than non-HCs (1a) and control group firms (1b).
With an average digital readiness of 0.425 HCs demonstrate a 10.6 percentage points higher
mean score than non-HCs in the sample (0.319). Compared to control group firms, which
achieve higher average digital readiness (0.354) than unweighted non-HCs, they still exhibit a
statistically significant 7.1 percentage points higher readiness.
The reduction in the HC advantage can be explained by structural differences between non-
HCs and control group firms. Control group firms are specifically designed to match HCs in
terms of size, age, and industry class and thus tend to be larger and more concentrated in man-
ufacturing-related industries compared to non-HCs. As both characteristics already have a pos-
itive impact on the average digital readiness score36, a reduction in the HC-specific advantage
seems plausible. This observation holds even if regional controls37, which may affect the aver-
age firm digital readiness, are included (2a and 2b). However, the slight decrease of the HC
advantage to 6.9 percentage points (2b) may reflect the fact that HCs are more likely to be
located in regions where digitalization is already more advanced. All in all, the findings provide
support for the assumption that HCs prioritize and invest in new technologies earlier than their
industry peers (Simon 2012, 2019).
Table 9: Comparison of digital readiness index levels
Digital readiness index levels
Digital readiness index score [0-1]
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Hidden champions 0.106*** 0.071*** 0.111*** 0.069***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021)
Constant 0.319*** 0.354*** 0.312*** 0.326***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.026)
Control group weights No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.007 0.031 0.021 0.036
Observations 3,743 3,743 3,743 3,743
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type
and are all measured at the administrative district level. Control group weights are derived from
an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
36 This information is provided in the description of the digital readiness index in Chapter 4.2.
37 See Table C.14 in the appendix for an overview and description of the included regional control variables.
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Figure 4 shows that HCs outperform control group firms at every individual component of the
digital readiness index38. Except for digital connectedness with suppliers (4) and the use of
social media (9), the differences in effect sizes are also statistically significant. This indicates
that HCs do not focus digitalization efforts on particular areas but emphasize a wide range of
digital technologies and applications. With an 11.4 percentage points higher score for HCs, big
data analysis capabilities show the largest difference, suggesting that compared to control group
firms, HCs seem to put more emphasis on rather sophisticated digital capabilities. Considering
the importance of data in the digital economy as well as in the context of digital innovations,
this leading edge may support them in creating a technological lead over their competitors.
Figure 4: Comparison of all digital readiness index items
Notes: This figure plots point estimates for the individual items on which the digital readiness index is
based on. 95% confidence intervals are depicted as lines.
38 See Table C.16 in the appendix for a detailed overview of the individual item scores for HCs, non-HCs, and
control group firms.
(1) Digital connectedness in production
(2) Digital connectedness in logistics
(3) Digital connectedness to customers
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Summary of the results
The results of the IV estimations provide evidence for a significant and positive effect of firm
digital readiness on the market performance of innovations and firm productivity. Moreover, I
find that HCs are significantly more productive compared to control group firms with similar
levels of digital readiness. Low statistical power due to a relatively small HC-specific sample
size (50-64), prevents the identification of statistically significant digital readiness effects for
the HC subsample. However, I find no reason to believe that the digital readiness effect size
differs between HCs and structurally similar control group firms. A comparison of digital read-
iness scores reveals a significantly higher digital readiness average for HCs which also outper-
form control group firms at every of the 11 surveyed indicators for digitalization. This digital
lead may allow HCs to benefit from the positive effects of higher levels of digital readiness on
innovation performance and productivity and more importantly, should also facilitate the de-
velopment of digital innovations in the future.
Evaluating firm preparedness towards digital transformation is a complex endeavor and diffi-
cult to reduce to individual decisive factors. It depends on various additional factors, such as a
firm’s cultural, strategic and structural alignment, that are not captured by the presented digital
readiness index. However, the regression results in combination with the theoretical foundation
of the DCV that indicates superior innovation, leadership and organizational capabilities, pro-
vide strong support for my hypothesis. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that HCs are
better prepared for the digital transformation than non-HCs, and firms of similar size, age and
industry characteristics in particular.
5.4 Robustness Tests
To verify that the results in Tables 7 and 8 are not mainly driven by control group design, I run
the regressions without entropy balance weights. These models basically describe the effect of
digital readiness on the outcome variables for the original and unadjusted sample of HCs and
non-HCs.
Corresponding to findings in Tables 7 and 8, I find no indication for instrument weakness and
that the OLS underestimates the effect of digital readiness on the outcomes. The results (cf.
Tables C.10 – C.14 in the appendix) of the 2SLS regressions indicate a decrease in effect size
for the digital readiness index for all outcome variables. Still, they remain highly significant
and of substantial size. The decrease in digital readiness effect size may indicate that HCs and
similar control group firms benefit disproportionally from digitalization. Since HCs and control
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group firms significantly differ from the unadjusted full sample, specifically in terms of indus-
try distribution and firm size, this may indicate that the impact of digitalization is dependent on
these parameters. In particular, firms which are relatively large and operate primarily in manu-
facturing-related industries seem to profit more from investments in digital capabilities than the
average firm in the sample. Contrary to the previous models, I find significant positive HC-
specific effects for the share of revenues from all innovations as well as from incremental in-
novations in the unweighted sample. This confirms previous studies that show superior HC
capabilities in terms of continuous product and service portfolio improvements (Simon 2012;
Rammer & Spielkamp 2019). The results support a positive effect of digital readiness on all
outcome variables. At the same time, the findings emphasize the importance of a valid control
group approach for determining HC-specific effects.
To investigate a potential impact of region-specific characteristics on the effect of digital read-
iness on the outcome variables, I include a set of regional control variables.39 The respective
regression models specifically observe the effect of population density, jobs to resident ratio,
and the region type, all measured at the administrative district level. A direct comparison with
the regressions in Tables 7 and 8 shows slightly decreased but still substantial digital readiness
effects on the outcome variables with significance levels remaining stable (cf. Tables C.10 –
C.14 in the appendix). While the results suggest that regional factors can influence the impact
of digital readiness, they again confirm the positive impact of digital readiness described in the
previous subsections.
6 Conclusion
In this study, I investigate how digitalization affects firm performance and specifically focus
on the digital preparedness of HCs compared to non-HC firms of similar age, size, and within
the same industry class. Supported by empirical evidence, organizational theory emphasizes
that especially in highly dynamic environments, DCs can improve long-term competitiveness
by enabling firms to sense threats, seize opportunities, and reconfigure their resource base. Pre-
vious studies regularly refer to innovation competence, entrepreneurial leadership, and organi-
zational agility as key determinants for strong DCs. Consistent with previous HC research, I
39 See Table C.15 in the appendix for an overview and description of the included regional control variables.
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show that these features are particularly pronounced in HCs which indicates superior DCs that
may help HCs to be better prepared for the digital transformation.
To study this, I draw on data from the MIP survey of 2016, 2017 and 2018. This enables the
development of a digital readiness index that measures the prevalence of 11 digital applications
as well as to classify firms in HCs and non-HCs. Due to endogeneity concerns, I analyze the
effect of digital readiness on firm performance using an IV-setup. My findings show a signifi-
cant and substantial positive effect of digital readiness on the innovation performance and
productivity, confirming results in previous studies. Moreover, I find that HCs demonstrate
significantly higher levels of firm-level digitalization than non-HCs as well as control group
firms with similar demographic characteristics. In combination with the positive performance
effects of increased levels of digital readiness, this strongly supports the assumption that HCs
are indeed better prepared for the digital transformation than non-HC firms.
My findings contribute to research on HCs as well as SMEs in general. Existing studies on HCs
often lack empirical evidence, rely on case studies or are limited in terms of information value
due to small sample sizes. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one empirical study (cf.
Freimark et al. 2018) that specifically investigates digitalization in the context of HCs. In more
general terms, the results contribute to research about the effect of firm-level digitalization lev-
els on performance. The positive effect of increased levels of digital readiness suggests that
investments in digital technologies and capabilities can allow firms to significantly improve
their innovation performance and productivity. From a practitioner’s point of view, these find-
ings may help to reduce reluctance concerning digitalization efforts due to uncertain and diffi-
cult to assess outcomes. Moreover, it specifically links the strategic focus of HCs on superior
innovation competence, entrepreneurial leadership styles, and organizational agility to en-
hanced preparedness towards digital transformation. This may provide guidance to firm leaders
on how to adjust their organization so that it can better cope with the challenges of the digital
age and improve competitiveness.
This study is subject to several limitations.40 First, the digital readiness index may provide a
biased picture of firm digitalization as respondents may differ when defining individual digital
applications and assessing their prevalence within their organization. Although my control
40 A general limitation of the IV-setup is that if the untestable exchangeability and exclusion restrictions do not
hold, the estimations of the 2SLS would not be consistent. Moreover, the LATE measures the effect of digital
readiness on performance for an unknown subgroup which may limit generalizability of the results (Becker
2016).
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group approach mitigates the effect of differences in firm size, age, and industry affiliation, the
position of respondents within the organization may systematically affect the digital readiness
scores. Second, the index is limited in terms of scope. It only covers 11 rather specific digital
capabilities and technologies and does not include other critical aspects such as a firm’s digital
alignment in terms of culture, organization and business model. Third, data on firm digitaliza-
tion is limited to a single survey year which may not satisfy the dynamic nature of developments
in the context of digital transformation. Fourth, my small sample of HC observations does not
provide enough statistical power to investigate a HC-specific effect of digital readiness on the
outcome variables. Thus, my conclusions rely on the assumption that the average effect size
does not differ between HCs and control group firms.
Future research may want to address some of these limitations, for example, by conducting
regular surveys to measure digital capabilities of firms which would enable a panel-based anal-
ysis of performance effects. This could increase robustness of the results, enable fixed-effects
methods, and reveal trends in firm digitalization levels. Researchers could also specifically in-
vestigate if the digital gap between HCs and other firms is changing over time and whether the
digital transformation affects the composition of HCs. Due to the global scale of the phenome-
non and its cross-national implications, it makes sense to transfer the analysis in broader context
and compare the digital capabilities of Germany’s HCs with international firms. Future studies
could try to apply existing approaches (e.g., Karimi & Walter 2015) and specifically measure
the strength of dynamic capabilities of HCs. To increase generalizability of the IV estimates,
researchers may also want to identify additional instruments and investigate how they affect the
effect sizes of digital readiness on the outcome.
Appendix
A Supplementary Information
Appendix A.1: Mannheim Innovation Panel – survey 2016 extract
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B Supplementary Figures
Figure B.1: Density comparison over industry classes
Figure B.2: Density comparison over size classes
Notes: For illustration purposes the figure shows the logarithm of employees. However, the entropy bal-
ance control group approach uses the actual number of employees. This explains the remaining differ-
ences between HCs and control group firms.
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Figure B.3: Density comparison over age groups
Notes: For illustration purposes the figure shows age groups. However, the entropy
balance control group approach uses the exact firm age. This explains the remaining
differences between HCs and control group firms.
Figure B.4: Scree plot of eigenvalues
Note: This figure shows eigenvalues over factors and according to the ‘elbow’ cri-














Figure B.5: Distribution of digital readiness index scores




Table C.1: Industry class description and NACE2 equivalent
Industry class Description Share of HCs NACE2 equivalent
1 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing - 01-03
2 Mining, quarrying, and other industries - 05-09; 35-39
3
Manufacture of food products, beverages, tabacco products, textiles, apparel,
leather, and related products 4.31% 10-15
4 Manufacture of wood and paper products and printing 5.17% 16-18
5
Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum products, chemicals, chemical products,
pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical, and botanical products 5.17% 19-21
6
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products, mineral products, basic metals and
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 11.21% 22-25
7 Manufacture of computer, electronic, optical products, and electrical equipment 21.55% 26-27
8 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 31.90% 28
9 Manufacture of transport euqipment 11.21% 29-30
10 Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment 6.03% 31-33
11 Construction - 41-43
12
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food
service activities 1.72% 45-47; 49-53; 55-56
13 Information and communication - 58-63
14 Financial and insurance activities - 64-66
15 Real estate activities - 68
16 Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities 1.72% 69-75; 77-82
17 Public administration, defence, education, human health, and social work activities - 84-88




Covariate HCs Pre Post HC Pre Post HC Pre Post Pre Post
Employees 2015 821.870 260.088 821.929 8,178,812.63 32,240,469.88 8,179,518.02 6.931 50.537 6.932 0.196 0.000
Year of foundation 1968.733 1981.589 1968.873 1541.171 1360.866 1541.262 -1.870 -4.977 -1.880 -0.327 -0.004
Industry classes
(3) Manufacture of food products, beverages,
tobacco products, textiles, apparel, leather, and
related products
0.043 0.075 0.043 0.042 0.069 0.042 4.499 3.225 4.482 -0.157 -0.001
(4) Manufacture of wood and paper products and
printing 0.052 0.045 0.052 0.049 0.043 0.049 4.048 4.416 4.033 0.032 -0.002
(5) Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum
products, chemicals, chemical products,
pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical, and
botanical products
0.052 0.025 0.052 0.049 0.024 0.049 4.048 6.119 4.033 0.121 -0.002
(6) Manufacture of rubber and plastic products,
mineral products, basic metals and fabricated
metal products, except machinery and equipment
0.112 0.112 0.113 0.100 0.100 0.101 2.460 2.453 2.438 -0.001 -0.004
(7) Manufacture of computer, electronic, optical
products, and electrical equipment 0.216 0.066 0.218 0.171 0.062 0.170 1.384 3.496 1.367 0.362 -0.006
(8) Manufacture of machinery and equipment
n.e.c. 0.319 0.037 0.322 0.219 0.036 0.218 0.777 4.877 0.764 0.602 -0.006
(9) Manufacture of transport equipment 0.112 0.015 0.113 0.100 0.014 0.101 2.460 8.102 2.438 0.308 -0.004
(10) Other manufacturing, and repair and
installation of machinery and equipment 0.060 0.056 0.061 0.057 0.053 0.057 3.693 3.847 3.678 0.017 -0.002
(16) Professional, scientific, technical,
administration and support service activities 0.017 0.240 0.017 0.017 0.182 0.017 7.417 1.217 7.390 -1.704 -0.001
Treated units: 116     Total of weights: 116
Control units: 3,637  Total of weights: 116
Notes: This table shows the covariate distribution as well as the standardized differences between the covariates before and after entropy balancing is applied using Stata's ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013). Only
industry classes that contain hidden champions are included in the balancing, all firms in other industries are excluded from balancing.
Means Variance Skewness Std. diff.
Controls Controls Controls
Table C.2: Entropy balance table for HCs, non-HCs and control group firms
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Joint digital readiness index 0-11 + 0.382 0.889 0.883 3,761
Production and/or provision of services
(1) Digital connectedness within production and/or provision of services 0-32 + 0.369 0.878 0.847 3,775
(2) Digital connectedness between production and/or provision of services and logistics 0-3 + 0.373 0.881 0.843 3,775
(3) Digital connectedness with customers 0-3 + 0.374 0.878 0.850 3,773
(4) Digital connectedness with suppliers 0-3 + 0.386 0.882 0.833 3,771
Internal organization and communication
(5) Teleworking 0-3 + 0.385 0.880 0.925 3,773
(6) Software-based communication (Skype etc.) 0-3 + 0.372 0.876 0.896 3,773
(7) Intranet-based platforms (Wikis etc.) 0-3 + 0.374 0.877 0.917 3,774
Sales and external communications
(8) E-commerce 0-3 + 0.387 0.880 0.921 3,774
(9) Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) 0-3 + 0.396 0.883 0.910 3,775
Information processing
(10) Cloud applications 0-3 + 0.388 0.881 0.890 3,775
(11) Analysis of Big Data 0-3 + 0.395 0.880 0.893 3,776
Notes: 1 Scale is normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 0=no digital readiness and  1=complete digital readiness. 2 Scale ranges from 0 to 3, with 0=no usage, 1=low usage, 2=medium
usage, 3=high use of the respective technology in the firm. Results for alpha values as reported by Stata's alpha command. Results for KMO values as reported by the postestimation com-
mand kmo in Stata.
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Table C.4: Digital readiness – factor analysis results
Factor analysis / correlation Number of observations: 3,761
Method: Principal factors Retained factors: 1
Rotation: (unrotated)1 Number of params: 11
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 4,757 3,975 0.879 0.879
Factor 2 0.782 0.444 0.144 1,024
Factor 3 0.337 0.098 0.062 1,086
Factor 4 0.238 0.123        0.044 1,130
Factor 5 0.115 0.193         0.021 1,151
Factor 6 0.078 0.008     0.014 1,137
Factor 7 -0.087 0.028 0.016 1,121
Factor 8 -0.116 0.039 0.021 1,099
Factor 9 -0.155 0.015 0.028 1,070
Factor 10 -0.171 0.039        0.031 1,039
Factor 11 -0.211            . 0.039 1,000
Variable Factor 1 Uniqueness
(1) Digital connectedness within production and/or provision of
services 0.673 0.368
(2) Digital connectedness between production and/or provision of
services and logistics 0.639 0.403
(3) Digital connectedness with customers 0.675 0.364
(4) Digital connectedness with suppliers 0.608 0.420
(5) Teleworking 0.655 0.486
(6) Software-based communication (Skype etc.) 0.726 0.363
(7) Intranet-based platforms (Wikis etc.) 0.704 0.420
(8) E-commerce 0.636 0.513
(9) Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) 0.594 0.537
(10) Cloud applications 0.644 0.456
(11) Analysis of Big Data 0.664 0.434
Notes: 1Since there is only 1 retained factor with an Eigenvalue > 1 left, the results for the factor values equal those of the (varimax) rotated solution.
Results as reported by Stata's factor command. The factor loadings are computed using the squared multiple correlations as estimates of the common-
ality.
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Table C.5: Share of revenues from all types of innovations – subsamples
Dependent variable: Share of revenues from all types of innovations 2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates - sub samples
Subgroup Control group firms Hidden champions
(OLS) (IV estimates) (OLS) (IV estimates)
Digital readiness 27.378*** 49.023** 17.446 37.983
(5.379) (21.441) (12.576) (33.584)
Constant -2.993 -10.782 8.514 1.931
(2.026) (7.528) (6.947) (11.581)
First-stage results









Control group weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.131 0.067 0.032 0.004
First-stage F statistic 11.520 28.020
Underidentification test 9.617 7.996
Mean of dep. variable 11.828 15.046
-Chow test- results
F statistic 0.535 0.077
p-value 0.465 0.782
Observations 2,075 2,075 60 60
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). The
Chow test is the test of equality between the digital readiness coefficients of the respective sub sample results for OLS & IV
estimation (Chow 1960) as reported by Stata’s suest command. Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing
method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.6: Share of revenues from incremental innovations – subsamples
Dependent variable: Share of revenues from incremental innovations 2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates - sub samples
Subgroup Control group firms Hidden champions
(OLS) (IV estimates) (OLS) (IV estimates)
Digital readiness 11.446** 22.550 16.652 32.150
(4.590) (19.045) (11.615) (33.511)
Constant 0.641 -3.312 5.190 0.405
(1.824) (6.545) (5.680) (11.008)
First-stage results









Control group weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.040 0.016 0.033 0.015
First-stage F statistic 9.536 26.433
Underidentification test 8.266 7.964
Mean of dep. variable 8.273 11.618
-Chow test- results
F statistic 0.038 0.000
p-value 0.845 0.990
Observations 2,056 2,056 57 57
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). The
Chow test is the test of equality between the digital readiness coefficients of the respective sub sample results for OLS & IV
estimation (Chow 1960) as reported by Stata’s suest command. Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing
method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.7: Share of revenues from radical innovations – subsamples
Dependent variable: Share of revenues from radical innovations 2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates - sub samples
Subgroup Control group firms Hidden champions
(OLS) (IV estimates) (OLS) (IV estimates)
Digital readiness 14.299* 25.743* 3.237 9.867
(7.620) (14.797) (3.966) (7.863)
Constant -3.454* -7.519 3.853 1.806
(1.925) (4.896) (3.247) (1.767)
First-stage results









Control group weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.152 0.078 0.184 0.151
First-stage F statistic 9.580 26.433
Underidentification test 8.308 7.964
Mean of dep. variable 3.058 3.605
-Chow test- results
F statistic 1.074 0.270
p-value 0.300 0.604
Observations 2,070 2,070 57 57
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). The
Chow test is the test of equality between the digital readiness coefficients of the respective sub sample results for OLS & IV
estimation (Chow 1960) as reported by Stata’s suest command. Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing
method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.8: Firm productivity – subsamples
Dependent variable: Productivity 2017 (log)
OLS vs. IV estimates - sub samples
Subgroup Control group firms Hidden champions
(OLS) (IV estimates) (OLS) (IV estimates)
Digital readiness 1.097*** 2.668*** 0.239 0.533
(0.237) (0.915) (0.358) (0.851)
Constant 11.592*** 11.025*** 11.680*** 11.581***
(0.089) (0.336) (0.217) (0.355)
First-stage results









Control group weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.135 -0.120 0.147 0.139
First-stage F statistic 13.569 30.034
Underidentification test 11.324 7.805
Mean of dep. variable 11.903 12.196
-Chow test- results
F statistic 4.162 3.395
p-value 0.041 0.066
Observations 2,101 2,101 64 64
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). The
Chow test is the test of equality between the digital readiness coefficients of the respective sub sample results for OLS & IV
estimation (Chow 1960) as reported by Stata’s suest command. Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing
method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.9: Revenue growth rate – subsamples
Dependent variable: Revenue growth rate 2016-2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates - sub samples
Subgroup Control group firms Hidden champions
(OLS) (IV estimates) (OLS) (IV estimates)
Digital readiness 11.155*** 22.717 32.531 19.405
(4.056) (21.128) (20.548) (29.591)
Constant -0.104 -4.298 -2.740 1.578
(2.017) (7.777) (9.233) (11.242)
First-stage results









Control group weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.018 0.004 0.077 0.067
First-stage F statistic 13.975 35.418
Underidentification test 11.112 7.708
Mean of dep. variable 5.857 7.440
-Chow test- results
F statistic 0.968 0.086
p-value 0.325 0.770
Observations 1,692 1,692 50 50
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). The
Chow test is the test of equality between the digital readiness coefficients of the respective sub sample results for OLS & IV
estimation (Chow 1960) as reported by Stata’s suest command. Control group weights are derived from an entropy balancing
method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.10: Share of revenues from innovations – robustness tests
Dependent variable: Share of revenues from all types of innovations 2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates
OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Hidden champion 7.576*** 5.224* 2.193 1.531
(2.479) (2.875) (2.755) (2.802)
Digital readiness 15.678*** 43.351*** 23.428*** 42.220*
(1.834) (15.785) (5.660) (21.941)
Constant 1.262** -7.343 0.749 -5.428
(0.527) (4.861) (2.748) (7.515)
First-stage results













Control group weights No No Yes Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.053 -0.086 0.079 0.043
First-stage F statistic 19.585 26.547
Underidentification test 19.206 14.217
Observations 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). Control
group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.11: Share of revenues from incr. innovations – robustness tests
Dependent variable: Share of revenues from incremental innovations 2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates
OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Hidden champion 5.943** 4.729* 2.824 2.226
(2.390) (2.629) (2.650) (2.729)
Digital readiness 11.594*** 26.095** 12.605*** 28.835
(1.530) (12.843) (4.883) (22.240)
Constant 1.114*** -3.377 1.419 -3.819
(0.431) (3.955) (2.191) (7.405)
First-stage results













Control group weights No No Yes Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.041 -0.012 0.038 0.004
First-stage F statistic 19.480 23.100
Underidentification test 19.123 12.850
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). Control
group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.12: Share of revenues from radical innovations – robustness tests
Dependent variable: Share of revenues from radical innovations 2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates
OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Hidden champion 2.117*** 1.237 0.132 -0.046
(0.776) (0.937) (1.232) (1.163)
Digital readiness 3.356*** 13.910** 10.334* 15.115**
(0.801) (5.925) (5.452) (7.349)
Constant 0.168 -3.104* -0.690 -2.230
(0.238) (1.792) (1.493) (1.767)
First-stage results













Control group weights No No Yes Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.017 -0.115 0.086 0.107
First-stage F statistic 19.972 23.130
Underidentification test 19.635 12.875
Observations 2,127 2,127 2,127 2,127
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). Control
group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.13: Firm productivity – robustness tests
Dependent variable: Productivity 2017 (log)
OLS vs. IV estimates
OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Hidden champion 0.508*** 0.415*** 0.249*** 0.229***
(0.064) (0.100) (0.071) (0.072)
Digital readiness 0.482*** 1.545* 0.833*** 1.421**
(0.081) (0.851) (0.217) (0.612)
Constant 11.493*** 11.158*** 11.497*** 11.299***
(0.031) (0.269) (0.102) (0.225)
First-stage results













Control group weights No No Yes Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.029 -0.050 0.146 0.112
First-stage F statistic 20.539 28.828
Underidentification test 20.246 15.347
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). Control
group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
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Table C.14: Revenue growth rate – robustness tests
Dependent variable: Revenue growth rate 2016-2017 (in %)
OLS vs. IV estimates
OLS IV estimates OLS IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Hidden champion 4.430 2.014 1.579 1.550
(2.762) (3.724) (2.939) (2.949)
Digital readiness 5.745* 38.647 17.111** 19.430
(3.125) (35.514) (6.832) (18.538)
Constant 0.803 -9.424 -1.232 -2.029
(1.165) (11.058) (3.381) (6.766)
First-stage results













Control group weights No No Yes Yes
Regional controls No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.003 -0.074 0.033 0.032
First-stage F statistic 15.345 31.793
Underidentification test 14.965 15.319
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Regional controls include population density, jobs per 1,000 residents, and region type and are all measured at the
administrative district level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al. 2010). Control
group weights are derived from an entropy balancing method using Stata’s ebalance command (Hainmueller & Xu 2013).
Table C.15: Description of regional control variables and instrument
Regional controls Description Min. Max. Mean Obs.
Population density 2016 Population density per km
2 for every of the 402 German administrative
districts
18 4,713 1,113 3,753
Job densitiy 2016 Number of jobs (+residents) per km2 for every of the 402 Germanadmininstrative districts 16.700 5,961 385.812 3,753
Region type 2016
Settlement-based region type fro every of the 402 German administrative dis-
tricts. Categorical variable with 1 = urban regions, 2 = regions with signs of
urbanization, 3 = rural regions
1.00 3.00 1.742 3,751
Instrument variable
Broadband access (2016) Percentage of households in administrative district with at least 50MBitsInternet access 1 100 71.775 3,753




Variable / item Range of scale Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev Diff. Mean Std. dev. Diff.
Measure: Digital readiness index 0-11 0.425 0.189 0.319 0.218 0.106 *** 0.353 0.210 0.072 ***
Production and/or provision of services
(1) Digital interconnectivity within production and/or provision of services 0-1 0.618 0.302 0.519 0.357 0.099 *** 0.525 0.324 0.093 ***
(2) Digital interconnectivity between production and/or provision of services and
logistics 0-1 0.601 0.282 0.423 0.360 0.178 *** 0.503 0.322 0.098 ***
(3) Digital interconnectivity with customers 0-1 0.566 0.282 0.488 0.336 0.078 ** 0.511 0.310 0.055 *
(4) Digital interconnectivity with suppliers 0-1 0.483 0.293 0.416 0.323 0.067 ** 0.462 0.302 0.021
Internal organization and communication
(5) Teleworking 0-1 0.351 0.267 0.239 0.304 0.112 *** 0.269 0.285 0.082 ***
(6) Software-based communication (Skype etc.) 0-1 0.448 0.285 0.294 0.322 0.154 *** 0.364 0.320 0.084 ***
(7) Intranet-based platforms (Wikis etc.) 0-1 0.417 0.294 0.276 0.324 0.141 *** 0.324 0.313 0.093 ***
Sales and external communications
(8) E-commerce 0-1 0.336 0.269 0.244 0.300 0.092 *** 0.274 0.294 0.062 **
(9) Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) 0-1 0.250 0.278 0.219 0.286 0.031 0.242 0.287 0.008
Information processing
(10) Cloud applications 0-1 0.307 0.311 0.226 0.300 0.081 *** 0.225 0.278 0.082 **







Notes: 1 Scale is normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 0=no digital readiness and  1=complete digital readiness.
                * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (based on heteroskedasticity robust estimation).
Hidden champions
Table C.16: Digital readiness item scores – entropy balance results
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